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HANK C. JENKINS-SMITH

An Industry in Turmoil: The
Remaking of
The Natural Gas Industry
The natural gas industry has entered a new era-an era unimaginable
to its participants even a few years ago. The emergence of the new era
can be seen in many indicators: unpredictable and volatile swings in gas
prices that have belied industry and government projections; deregulation
has proceeded apace, thrusting many market participants into the uncertainties of the competitive market; and competition among natural gas
producers has intensified, while competition with alternative fuels and
fuel switching among consumers has compounded uncertainty about future sale volumes and prices. The politics of natural gas policy has become
increasingly fractuous, pitting segments of the industry against one another, consumers against suppliers, and even created friction between
levels of government. Perhaps the most unwelcome aspect of this new
era is the tremendous level of uncertainty that has developed. Among
market participants, uncertainty impedes construction of reliable trade
patterns, straining market relationships and increasing reliance on court
action. For public officials, uncertainty has made effective and reasonable
policymaking all the more difficult. Truly the gas industry is in turmoil.
My objective in this paper is to trace the development of the turmoil
in the gas industry to fundamental transitions in energy markets and to
changes in public policy in the United States. Furthermore, I assess the
prospects for stabilization in the market in coming years. These issues
provide the backdrop for the specific points-of-view that are presented in
following chapters in this volume.
TRANSITIONS IN THE GAS MARKET-THE FIRST TWO ERAS

The history of the gas industry can be broken into three periods of
time based on the prevalent market conditions and levels of regulatory
constraint. The first era, lasting roughly from the turn of the century to
the early 1970s, was characterized by highly stable prices, an expanding
market (as pipeline technology improved and pipelines were constructed),
and regulation primarily limited to gas moving in interstate trade. I Wellhead prices (in 1982 dollars) rose from 26 cents per thousand cubic feet
(mcf) in 1949 to about 45 cents per mcf in 1960, and remained fairly
!. E. SANDERs, THE REGULATION OF NATURAL GAs PoucY AND Poixncs, 1938-78 (1981).
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steady at that level through 1973 (see Figure 1).' Overall, this was a
period of considerable stability for the industry, in which market relations
FIGURE 1
NATURAL GAS WELLHEAD PRICES
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(April 1987).
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tended to be dominated by the major interstate pipelines which acted as
both owners and transporters of gas.
The first era was brought to an abrupt end by the onset of the Arab oil
embargo and the energy crisis of 1973-74. Rapidly rising oil prices were
paced by rapid increases in wellhead gas prices, resulting in a rise from
44 cents per mcf in 1974 to a peak of $2.66 per mcf in 1984 (in 1982
dollars). Also in the early 1970s, annual dry gas production peaked at
21.73 trillion cubic feet (tcf) and began a sustained decline (see Figure
2). Gas imports, primarily from Canada and Mexico, have made up a
significant fraction of the market since the late 1960s (see Waldman article
in this volume).
Perhaps the most pervasive change in the gas market, however, stemmed
from intensified regulatory efforts by the federal government. Through
the 1970s rising energy prices led to intensified conflict between producers
and consumers, between various types of producers (for example, deep
well "new gas" producers versus "old gas" producers), and regions of
the country. This conflict led ultimately to passage of the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), which established numerous gas categoriesbased roughly on the date and cost of well completion-and established
price ceilings for each category.3
Market relationships in this era were predicated on the existence of
price controls and the perception that demand for energy-and hence
demand for gas-would continue to rise. As recently as 1983, for example, the U.S. Department of Energy was predicting a substantial rise
in gas comsumption-from 17.7 tcf in 1982 to a projected 19.7 tcf in
1985 (actual 1985 consumption was 17.3 tcf).' Given expectations of
continued price increases and regulated prices, wellhead sales were based
in part on nonprice factors such as take-or-pay contract provisions by
which producers were assured of sales regardless of whether pipelines
needed the gas. Pipelines, in turn, would sell the gas to distributors or
other end-users at regulated prices based on average ("rolled-in") wellhead prices, a procedure that gave substantial price advantages to pipelines
supplied by large volumes of low-priced "old gas."
THE THIRD ERA
The beginning of the end of the second era of the gas industry corn2. Energy Information Agency, U.S. Department of Energy, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, DOEJEIA
0834(85) (May 1986); Energy Information Agency, U.S. Department of Energy, MONTHLY ENERGY
REv. (Jan. 1987), DOEIEIA 0035(87101) (Apr. 1987).
3. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1978).
4. Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis, U.S. Department of Energy, ENERGY PROJECnONS To
THE YEAR 2010, DOEIPE-0029/2 (Oct. 1983).
5. On the influence of average cost pricing, see W. Niskanen, Natural Gas Price Controls: An
Alternative View, REGUtAToN (Nov./Dec. 1986).
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FIGURE 2
U.S. NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION
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menced with the dramatic price rise of the 1970s, though the effects of
the price rise were masked by turbulence in the oil market until the early
1980s. Four basic categories of change marked the end of the era: de-
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creasing demand due to conservation efforts; intensified competition with
heavy petroleum products; increases in competition with imported natural
gas; and deregulation.
Demand for natural gas has fallen steadily since 1979, from 20.2 tcf
to only 16 tcf in 1986. In part this decline represents a reduction in
demand for energy of all kinds as conservation measures are taken in
response to the rise in energy prices since 1973. Also in part, the decline
in energy comsumption has been due to the relatively low rates of economic growth that have occurred since 1980. These influences on demand
can be seen in that U.S. energy consumption of all kinds reached almost
79 quadrillion Btu (QBtu) in 1979, fell to a low of 70.5 QBtu in 1983,
and has stagnated near 74 QBtu since 1983.
But overall energy consumption is only part of the story: the relative
decrease in oil prices has also done much to reduce gas consumption.
Driven by a price war within OPEC, the price of imported oil plummeted
from an average of about $26 per barrel in 1985 to a low of $9.72 in
July of 1986. Many of the industrial and utility consumers of natural gas
are capable of switching between natural gas and such heavy oil products
as basic boiler fuels. As oil prices began their dramatic slide in 1986,
many of these consumers began switching from gas to oil. From 1985
to 1986, for example, industrial and utility consumers reduced gas use
by 11.4% and 14.5% respectively. Over the same period, fuel oil consumption has risen by about 1.3%, and residual fuel use by 16.4%. Thus,
due in large part to fuel switching capabilities, gas prices and demand
levels have become highly sensitive to fluctuations in the price of oil.
The increased competition with oil products has been compounded by
intensified competition with natural gas imports. In response to falling
energy prices, the Canadians have adopted a highly flexible pricing policy
that has permitted their gas exports to remain competitive-and even to
increase market share in some strategic U.S. markets (see the Waldman
article in this volume). Along with competition with oil, these imports
have served to keep downward pressure on the price of domestically
produced natural gas.
Perhaps more than any other factor, the third era of the natural gas
industry has been characterized by deregulation. Under the NGPA, regulated price ceilings have been phased out for many categories of gas
produced in the U.S.; as of November 1979, wells started after February
1977 and drilled to a depth in excess of 15,000 feet were deregulated,
as were wells drilled in geopressured brine, coal seams, and in Devonian
shale. By 1985 any "new" gas wells were deregulated, along with wells
drilled after April 1977 that were deeper than 5,000 feet, and wells
producing gas for certain categories of interstate trade. Thus much of the
price regulation of the NGPA has been lifted-and even prices of the
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still-regulated "old gas" categories appear to have fallen below NGPA
price ceilings. These developments have served to replace much of the
influence of government wellhead price regulation with the discipline of
market forces.
Deregulation has not stopped, however, with wellhead prices. The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and some states (notably New Mexico) have moved toward "contract carriage" provisions
that permit producers and consumers to ship gas on pipelines for a fixed
carriage fee. Such provisions are designed to allow for much greater
competition among producers and pipelines for sales of gas. Current
deregulatory emphasis at FERC has shifted from the wellhead to pipeline
transport and to pricing policy for sales by pipelines to distributors and
end users. 6
EFFECTS OF THE NEW MARKET CONDITIONS
What have been the effects of the new era for the natural gas industry?
The first and perhaps most fundamental change has been the introduction
of price and demand variability. Whereas the first era was characterized
by stable prices, and the second era by the expectation of continuously
rising prices, the industry now faces prices that can be expected to rise
and fall. As noted earlier, gas prices and demand are now highly sensitive
to fluctuations in oil prices, which are likely to remain volatile for the
foreseeable future.
The immediate effect of price variability has been a shrinkage of demand for domestically produced gas as oil products and as foreign gas
suppliers have enlarged their market share. While this situation is likely
to be reversed as oil prices climb (spot oil prices have more than doubled
since their low in July 1986), the most marked and lasting effect of market
variability on the industry is likely to be a fundamental restructuring of
trade relationships-and accompanying friction-within the industry.
An immediately apparent indicator of the changed trade relationships
and friction is the increased frequency of litigation among firms in the
industry. Disputes have flared over contract renegotiation between producers and pipelines, access of producers and consumers to pipeline
carrying capacity, and the structure of rates for various classes of gas
customers (see the Campbell and Baca articles in this volume). Also
becoming restive are natural gas consumers, some of whom perceive
themselves to be by-passed by the reductions in gas prices that are benefitting other gas consumers (see the Wellinghoff article in this volume).
6. Id. and C. M. Naeve's article in this volume for more information on current natural gas
regulatory activities.
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Yet another far reaching implication of the new era in the gas industry
has been a trend toward shifting regulatory responsibility from the federal
government-and specifically FERC-to the states and their regulatory
bodies. As FERC moves toward federal deregulation many aspects of
regulation, formerly the responsibility of FERC, will devolve to the states
(see the articles by Naeve and Baish in this volume). This trend may
raise some difficulties for some firms in the industry (particularly those
directly involved in interstate trade) due to the need to respond to multiple
regulatory bodies that may have conflicting policy objectives. Difficulties
are also raised for the state regulatory agencies, which will be charged
with regulation of an industry over which they have only partial jurisdiction. State regulators will also be confronted by a welter of issues,
many of them complex and rapidly changing, that will tax the expertise
and resources of their staffs (see the Ellis article in this volume). These
are problems that will become increasingly urgent as the deregulation
initiative at the federal level makes further headway.
Finally, while the implications of the third era of the gas industry for
consumers remain far from clear, some trends in gas pricing for different
classes of consumers can be discerned. For example, as pipelines are
forced to respond to the threat of major consumers (industrial or utility
users) leaving the system, they are likely to develop a pricing strategy
that favors large volume users over smaller consumers that have fewer
alternatives to gas. Already residential gas consumer groups are claiming
that the reductions in gas prices over the past few years have by-passed
them in favor of utilities and industrial users (see the Wellinghoff article
in this volume). On the basis of these claims, it can be anticipated that
strong political pressure will be put on states and the federal government
to maintain or expand pipeline and distribution company regulation to
assure that residential consumers are not charged "unfair" rates relative
to other gas users.
PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY?
Will the turmoil in the gas industry continue? In some respects, the
answer is almost surely yes. Demand for gas, and hence gas prices, are
now tied for better or worse to the oil markets. Factors endemic to the
international oil markets (for example, tensions within the OPEC cartel)
are likely to maintain highly volatile supplies and prices for the forseeable
future. The likelihood of volatile prices, in turn, is likely to encourage
more consumers to develop fuel switching capabilities that will tie the
gas and oil markets together still more tightly., Thus demand and prices
will remain a source of volatility for the gas industry.
But fluctuations in prices and quantity demanded need not lead to the

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 27

sort of turmoil we have witnessed in recent years. The extent to which
the industry regains stability will depend on the degree to which market
participants are able to establish new trading patterns that can be flexibly
adapted to changing market conditions, and on the extent to which new
regulatory initiatives at both the state and federal level permit or encourage
the development of such flexible trade patterns. Given the instability of
energy markets generally, it is now widely conceded that it will not be
possible to impose fixed price or allocation controls without inflicting
severe damage on both consumers and producers. 7 What, then, are the
prospects?
The following chapters are intended to address precisely that question
from a range of viewpoints emanating from public regulators and from
key segments of the natural gas industry. Naeve, Waldman and Ellis are
written by public officials, looking at the role of the federal government
in deregulation (Naeve), the regulation of gas imports (Waldman), and
at the increasing dilemmas of state level regulators (Ellis). The subsequent
articles assess prospects for the future from the perspectives of majors
segments of the industry: interstate and intrastate (Balsh and James) pipelines, integrated and independent gas producers (Baca and Campbell),
and gas consumers (Wellinghoff). Finally (in Kelly), a former Chairman
of the New Mexico Public Service Commisssion attempts to sift these
viewpoints for common and divergent themes, assessing the broader question of what consensus-if any--exists regarding where the industry
should go from here.

7. For a careful examination of the analogous case of oil price and allocation controls during the
Tim ECONOMIcS AND POLMCS OF OIL PRICE REULAToN (1983). An analysis
of natural gas price controls is contained in G. Loury, Efficiency and Equity Impacts of NaturalGas
Deregulation,PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND POLICY ANALYSIS (R. Haveman, J. Margolis, 3rd ed., 1983).

1970s, see J. KALT,

